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CASE NOTE

IF ALL INVESTMENT BANKS ARE CONFLICTED, WHY
BLAME BARCLAYS? AN EXAMINATION OF INVESTMENT
BANK FEE STRUCTURES AND DEL MONTE FOODS

BONNIE W HITE†
INTRODUCTION
In February 2011, Vice Chancellor Laster held in In re Del Monte Foods
Co. Shareholders Litigation that the Del Monte Foods board of directors
breached its duty of care to the Del Monte stockholders by failing to
identify and guard against its investment banker Barclays’ conﬂicts in a
merger transaction with Blue Acquisition Group.1 The court identiﬁed four
instances of misbehavior throughout the sale process: (1) Barclays met
secretly with potential bidders to solicit interest in acquiring Del Monte
before the company was up for sale, and prior to being hired as the company’s sell-side advisor; 2 (2) once the company was up for sale, Barclays
facilitated a relationship between two competing bidders in violation of
conﬁdentiality agreements between the bidders and the company; 3 (3)
Barclays planned to and in fact did obtain the company’s permission to
provide the acquirers’ ﬁnancing;4 and (4) subsequent to the approval of the
merger agreement, Barclays conducted the go-shop despite an agreement to

† Senior Editor, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Volume 161. J.D., 2013, University of
Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2010, Boston University.
1 25 A.3d 813, 817-18, 836 (Del. Ch. 2011).
2 Id. at 820, 822.
3 Id. at 823.
4 Id. at 826.
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ﬁnance the acquirers.5 And how did the Del Monte board breach its duty? It
didn’t stop Barclays.
What could the board have done diﬀerently? The court explained that,
despite having relied in good faith on Barclays’ independence and expertise,
the Del Monte board breached its duty of care by failing to realize that
Barclays had pieced together a deal resulting in its earning more than forty
million dollars in fees from its dual role.6 The board, according to the court,
should have recognized that Barclays suﬀered from a conﬂict of interest as
it stood on both sides of the transaction by providing both sell-side advice
and buy-side ﬁnancing.7 I argue in this Note, however, that Barclays, and
indeed all sell-side advisors, face a serious conﬂict of interest in standing on
even one side of the transaction—by receiving success fees contingent on
the consummation of a merger. For that reason, it is unclear whether the
Del Monte decision imposed on boards of directors a duty to identify
conﬂicts that are more serious than those ordinarily accepted in the investment banking industry, or merely a duty to fully disclose all conﬂicts. But
considering the facts of Del Monte, I argue that the possibility of obtaining
permission to provide buy-side ﬁnancing is just another conﬂict shared by
all full-service investment banks, and that additional disclosure would not
have changed the outcome of the case. As a result, I conclude that Delaware
courts should either (1) accept that investment bankers are necessarily conﬂicted when working on the sale of a corporation or (2) require a fundamentally
diﬀerent fee structure for investment bankers working on such a sale, and
ultimately advocate for the elimination of success fees and staple ﬁnancing.
This Note proceeds as follows: In Part I, I describe investment banking
services provided in the sale of a corporation and common fee structures
used in those services. In Part II, I contextualize Del Monte with respect to
relevant case law, and in Part III, I describe the facts of the case. In Parts
IV and V, respectively, I present the claims brought against the Del Monte
board as well as the Delaware Court of Chancery’s response to those claims.
Part VI describes the consequences of the court’s holding for Del Monte
and Blue Acquisition Group. Finally, in Part VII, I argue that Barclays’
conﬂicts were no more signiﬁcant than the conﬂicts that exist for nearly all
full-service investment banks, and that, for this reason, additional disclosure
would not have aﬀected the outcome. I do make the caveat that the Del
5 Id. at 828; see also id. at 827 (identifying a forty-ﬁve-day post-signing go-shop period during
which Del Monte had the right to solicit competing oﬀers).
6 Id. at 818, 834-35.
7 Id. at 835-36.
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Monte board did breach its duty of care by permitting Barclays to conduct
the go-shop after Barclays had committed to provide the acquirers’ ﬁnancing. Finally, I analyze the standard for investment bank conﬂicts going forward
and advocate for eliminating success fees and staple ﬁnancing altogether.
I. T HE R OLE OF INVESTMENT BANKS IN THE SALE OF A C OMPANY
A. Fairness Opinions, Sell-Side Advising, Buy-Side Financing,
and Staple Financing
Investment banks participate in the sale of a company in three fundamental ways. First, investment banks provide fairness opinions that (a)
value a company using various valuation methods, and (b) determine
whether, given a company’s value, a particular price falls within a reasonable
range of fairness. 8 Boards of directors use fairness opinions to justify
accepting or rejecting a given oﬀer.9 Second, investment banks provide sellside advising to companies that have received oﬀers from one or more
potential acquirers, or that are interested in soliciting such oﬀers.10 Sell-side
advising often requires the banks to act as emissaries between target and
acquirer and to conduct go-shops to solicit additional bids for the company. 11 Banks also provide particularized knowledge about challenges and
opportunities available in a given industry and advise on strategic alternatives.12 Companies look to investment banks for insight on how to capitalize
on assets that make a company unique in its industry. Although providing a
fairness opinion may be analytically distinct from providing sell-side advice,
“investment banks delivering fairness opinions in a corporate control
8 See Steven M. Davidoﬀ, Fairness Opinions, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1557, 1558 (2006) (“A fairness opinion is an opinion . . . that a transaction meets a threshold level of fairness from a ﬁnancial perspective.”).
9 See id. at 1558-59 (“The board will rely on this opinion to satisfy its duty of care in the
determination of whether or not to proceed.”).
10 Cf. Mary Siegel, The Illusion of Enhanced Review of Board Actions, 15 U. P A . J. B US . L. 599,
610, 627-28 & nn.123-25 (2013) (explaining that a board of directors of a corporation that is up for
sale can satisfy its Revlon duties to maximize shareholder value by relying on advice from
independent ﬁnancial advisors and canvassing the market).
11 Cf. Guhan Subramanian, Go-Shops vs. No-Shops in Private Equity Deals: Evidence and Implications, 63 B US. L AW. 729, 730 (2008) (explaining that go-shops, which allow companies to seek
out higher bidders after they have conditionally committed to sell to a particular acquirer, “emerged
as an important new deal-making technology during the private equity boom of 2005–2007”).
12 See C OMM . ON N EGOTIATED A CQUISITIONS , A M . B AR A SS ’ N , T HE M&A P ROCESS :
A PRACTICAL G UIDE FOR THE BUSINESS LAWYER 77-78 (2005) (“An investment bank is a full
service ﬁnancial advisor that can generally provide advice regarding valuation of the target
(including rendering a fairness opinion), conduct the marketing process, advise on the appropriate
structure for the transaction, participate in the negotiation of ﬁnancial terms and even raise funds
to ﬁnance the transaction.”).
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transaction typically are also retained to render general ﬁnancial advice with
respect to the relevant transaction.” 13 Third, investment banks provide
partial or full ﬁnancing to, and become creditors of, bidders in the event
that an acquisition actually takes place.14
Finally, investment banks sometimes combine these services. Staple
ﬁnancing, for example, occurs when an investment bank acts as sell-side
advisor for a target company and agrees up front that, in the event that a
merger takes place, the bank will provide ﬁnancing to an acquirer if the
acquirer needs it. 15 Staple ﬁnancing has been criticized for creating a
conﬂict of interest for bankers who, on the one hand, seek as sell-side
advisors to maximize the price paid to the target’s stockholders, and on the
other, want as a creditor to ensure that an acquirer will be able to repay its
ﬁnancing obligations.16 Further, investment banks that oﬀer staple ﬁnancing
may favor bidders that are more likely to need ﬁnancing, such as private
equity ﬁrms, to the exclusion of parties less likely to require ﬁnancing, such
as strategic bidders. 17 The literature dealing with staple ﬁnancing has
primarily focused on balancing beneﬁts against the potential for harm, by
looking, for example, at the fact that allowing staple ﬁnancing makes
obtaining ﬁnancing easier in market conditions where it is diﬃcult to
otherwise procure ﬁnancing.18
B. Investment Banks’ Fees
When an investment bank provides a one-time fairness opinion, it usually does so for a speciﬁed transaction fee, which it collects regardless of
whether an acquisition occurs.19 Proxy statements usually disclose the basic
13
14
15

Davidoﬀ, supra note 8, at 1586.
See C OMM. ON N EGOTIATED A CQUISITIONS, supra note 12, at 77-78.
Christopher Foulds, My Banker’s Conﬂicted and I Couldn’t Be Happier: The Curious Durability
of Staple Financing, 34 D EL. J. C ORP. L. ���, ��� (����). Staple ﬁnancing may be more desirable
in a poor credit market where the availability of ﬁnancing is limited. See id. at 521-22.
16 See Davidoﬀ, supra note 8, at ���� (noting that an investment bank providing staple ﬁnancing “has an incentive for a lower target price so that the acquirer will not be over-leveraged after
the acquisition”).
17 See Foulds, supra note 15, at ��� (“The concern [with staple ﬁnancing] is that the target[]’s
ﬁnancial advisor may steer the sale to those bidders that will use staple ﬁnancing, and away from a
potentially higher bidder not using staple ﬁnancing.”); id. at 524 (“The main concern is the
potential that the seller will unfairly favor one bidder over another for reasons unrelated to
obtaining the highest value for the target’s shareholders. The suspicion is that a sell-advisor may
skew an auction in favor of those bidders who will also use the stapled-lender for ﬁnancing.”).
18 See, e.g., id. at 521-22.
19 Perella Weinberg Partners LP, for example, earned $3 million solely for providing a
second fairness opinion in the Del Monte–Blue Acquisition Group merger. In re Del Monte
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fee structure—that is, whether there is a contingent or set fee—underlying a
fairness opinion.20 By contrast, when an investment bank provides sell-side
advising, the bank usually charges three types of fees: a standard minimum
transaction fee, a “success” or “incentive” fee, and reimbursement for
expenses.21 The payment of a success fee is contingent on the deal closing
and is determined by a percentage of the total value of the deal.22 One
variation of the success fee is the “Lehman Formula,” which awards fees in
the amount of 5% of the ﬁrst $x million of the deal, 4% of the second $x
million, 3% of the third $x million, 2% of the fourth $x million, and 1% of the
remainder.23 Current advising fees more commonly amount to about .05%
of a transaction’s value, however.24 Success fees have been criticized for
creating a conﬂict of interest on the part of investment banks because the
relative size of the success fee as compared to the transaction fee may cause
a bank to encourage a target to accept a price that does not adequately value
the company for the sake of pushing any transaction through.25 The potential for conﬂicts has caused some commentators to argue that “the investment banker will have an economic incentive to persuade the seller to sell
the business even if the price is low or the non-price terms are unfair to the
seller,” 26 to which boards of directors should respond by selecting only
investment banks with excellent reputations and by actively overseeing the
chosen banks’ conduct.27
Providing buy-side ﬁnancing is often the most lucrative activity for
investment banks.28 For one, when an investment bank provides ﬁnancing
Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 826 (Del. Ch. 2011). When a fairness opinion is issued as
part of an investment bank’s sell-side advising engagement, however, the fee for the fairness
opinion is often subsumed into the bank’s “success” fee, and is therefore dependent on the
consummation of the transaction. Davidoﬀ, supra note 8, at 1586.
20 Blake Rohrbacher & John Mark Zeberkiewicz, Fair Summary: Delaware’s Framework for
Disclosing Fairness Opinions, 63 BUS. L AW. 881, 900 (2008).
21 See John F. Seegal, Investment Banking Fees, in 1 A CQUIRING OR S ELLING THE P RIVATELY H ELD C OMPANY 173, 175 (2009).
22 See Davidoﬀ, supra note 8, at 1586 (“The manner of compensation [for sell-side advising]
is a success fee payable to the bank at transaction milestones such as announcement or completion.”).
23 C OMM . ON N EGOTIATED A CQUISITIONS , supra note 12, at 79-80.
24 Foulds, supra note 15, at 525.
25 See Seegal, supra note 21, at ��� (“A ﬂaw in the Lehman formula and other similar declining percentage approaches is that they tend to reward the investment banker more highly for
selling the business than for selling the business at the highest price.”).
26 Id. at 176.
27 See id.
28 See Gina Chon & Shira Ovide, Judge Blasts Barclays over Del Monte Deal, W ALL S T . J.
(Feb. 16, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704409004576146471401456158.html
(“Providing ﬁnancing for acquirers usually generates more fees for investment banks than advising
sellers.”).
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for an acquirer, the bank does not accept the same level of risk that the deal
will not go through as it does when providing sell-side ﬁnancing. Financing
fees are stated as a ﬁxed percentage, typically between 1.3 and 1.5%, of the
total value of the loan.29 The investment bank also becomes a creditor to the
acquirer, who is required to repay the ﬁnancing.
II. B EFORE D EL M ONTE
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. established that,
where it is clear that a company is up for sale, a board of directors’ primary
duty with respect to the sale is to obtain the best price attainable for the
stockholders. 30 Smith v. Van Gorkom, although pre-Revlon, implied that
boards could satisfy their duties in the sale of a company by procuring a
fairness opinion and advice from an investment banker with respect to the
sale.31 With these two propositions in place—that a board must seek the
best price and that a board may rely on the expertise of investment bankers
to achieve that goal—obtaining fairness opinions and sell-side advice has
become best practice for Delaware corporations.
However, Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.32 and In re Toys “R” Us,
Inc. Shareholder Litigation33 complicated the view that a board may always
rely on an investment bank’s expertise to satisfy its ﬁduciary duties when
selling a company. In Macmillan, Mills Acquisition Company sought to
acquire Macmillan, Inc., which had already signed a merger agreement with
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. (KKR).34 Prior to entering into the KKR
merger agreement, Macmillan’s board, which had been planning to restructure the company, received an oﬀer from the Bass Group to purchase
Macmillan for $64 per share. 35 Evans, a board member with signiﬁcant
ﬁnancial interest in the company, opposed the merger and met privately with
Macmillan’s investment banker, Lazard Freres & Co., regarding the oﬀer.36
Lazard, over which Evans had signiﬁcant inﬂuence, advised Macmillan’s
29
30
31

Foulds, supra note 15, at 525.
506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
See 488 A.2d 858, 876 (Del. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965
A.2d 695 (Del. 2009); see also Davidoﬀ, supra note 8, at 1559 (noting that the court in Van Gorkom
“placed heavy reliance on the lack of a fairness opinion or other reliable valuation in a corporate
control transaction to sustain a holding that an acquiree board breached its duty of care”).
32 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989).
33 877 A.2d 975 (Del. Ch. 2005).
34 Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1264.
35 Id. at 1268.
36 Id. at 1267-68.
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board that the proposed recapitalization was fair and that the Bass Group’s
oﬀer was not;37 however, when the board rejected the Bass Group’s higher
counteroﬀer and adopted the recapitalization plan, the Delaware Court of
Chancery issued a preliminary injunction, ﬁnding that the board had
improperly relied on Lazard’s mischaracterizations of the available alternatives.38 At that point, the board immediately put the company up for sale.39
In spite of communication from Maxwell, another potential acquirer, that
he would top any bid by his competitor, KKR, the Macmillan board entered into
a merger agreement with KKR, whom Evans favored for personal reasons.40
The Delaware Supreme Court held that Macmillan’s board had
breached its duty of care because, “[a]lthough the Macmillan board was
fully aware of its ultimate responsibility for ensuring the integrity of the
auction, the directors wholly delegated the creation and administration of
the auction to an array of Evans’ hand-picked investment advisors.” 41
Because Macmillan’s investment bank had been operating under Evans’
control, the board was not entitled to rely on its ﬁnancial advice. The court
held that “[w]hile a board of directors may rely in good faith upon ‘information, opinions, reports or statements presented’ by corporate oﬃcers,
employees and experts ‘selected with reasonable care,’ it may not avoid its
active and direct duty of oversight in a matter as signiﬁcant as the sale of
corporate control.”42
Sixteen years later, in Toys “R” Us, then-Vice Chancellor Strine declined
to preliminarily enjoin a merger between Toys “R” Us and KKR,43 despite
the plaintiﬀs’ “sketch[ing] out a picture of a passive board who deferred too
easily to the wishes of a CEO, Eyler, and ﬁnancial advisor, First Boston.”44
Toys “R” Us originally planned to sell only its toy division, but changed its
mind when it received a bid of $25.25 per share for the entire company.45
Toys “R” Us, once committed to a sale of the company, quickly accepted a
bid from KKR for signiﬁcantly more than the next highest oﬀer it had
received.46 Then-Vice Chancellor Strine found that, while Eyler did have
some incentive to sell the company because of the “golden parachute” in his

37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Id. at 1270.
Id. at 1271.
Id. at 1272.
Id. at 1272-74.
Id. at 1281.
Id. (citation omitted).
In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 980 (Del. Ch. 2005).
Id. at 1002.
Id. at 986-87, 991-93.
Id. at 993-95.
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employment contract, his own ﬁnancial status did not ultimately motivate
his decision to sell to KKR.47 Further, the then-Vice Chancellor decided
that First Boston’s incentive fee structure48 and the fact that it agreed to
provide buy-side ﬁnancing to KKR did not result in the investment bank
“tilt[ing] the process in order to jack up its fees and proﬁts,” noting that
incentive fees “ha[ve] been recognized as proper by our courts.”49 Thus,
while Macmillan required that a board actively oversee the sales process and
identify conﬂicts of the dominating personalities involved, Toys “R” Us
suggested that some investment banks’ conﬂicts may be acceptable.
III. D EL M ONTE
A. The Parties
In 2010—before litigation began—Del Monte was one of the largest and
most proﬁtable food distributors in the United States: Richard Wolford,
Del Monte’s then-CEO, remarked that over the course of several years “Del
Monte [had transformed] from a $1 billion consumer foods business into a
branded pet and consumer products company with more than $3.7 billion in
revenues,”50 generating $250 million in cash ﬂow and increasing dividends
by 80%.51 Interestingly, Del Monte’s success came after a period of decline
in the 1990s. In the 1980s, Del Monte was a subsidiary of R.J. Reynolds
Industries, later renamed RJR Nabisco.52 When KKR acquired Nabisco in
1988, it sold Del Monte, which continued its canned foods business but, in
order to stay aﬂoat, was forced to sell many divisions that today are household names.53
Blue Acquisition Group is owned by private equity ﬁrms KKR, Centerview Partners, and Vestar Capital Partners.54 KKR is an infamous private
equity ﬁrm whose portfolio companies include Dollar General, Duracell,

47
48

Id. at 1004-05.
First Boston stood to earn an additional $7 million from Toys “R” Us if it facilitated a sale
of the entire company rather than the toy division alone. Id. at 998 & n.26.
49 Id. at 1005-06.
50 Consolidated Veriﬁed Class Action Complaint for Breach of Fiduciary Duties & Aiding &
Abetting, para. 3, In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813 (Del. Ch. 2011) (No.
6027-VCL), 2011 WL 118896.
51 Id.
52 Del Monte Foods Company History, FUNDINGUNIVERSE, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/
company-histories/Del-Monte-Foods-Company-Company-History.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2013).
53 Id. Among the divisions sold was Hawaiian Punch. Id.
54 Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 817.
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and Nabisco—Del Monte’s former parent. 55 KKR is no stranger to the
Delaware Court of Chancery, having litigated Macmillan, Toys “R” Us, and
countless other cases; its notorious takeover of Nabisco was the subject of
the 1990 book56 and 1993 made-for-television movie, Barbarians at the Gate.57
Centerview’s private equity arm, Centerview Capital, was founded in 2006
and invests solely in market consumer businesses. 58 In addition to Del
Monte, its portfolio consists entirely of The Nielsen Company and Richelieu Foods, Inc.59 Vestar is a private equity ﬁrm whose completed investments totaled $30 billion in 2011. 60 Prior to forming Vestar in 1988, its
founders were principals of The First Boston Corporation’s Management
Buyout Group61—the investment bank at issue in Toys “R” Us.
Barclays PLC is a global, U.K.-based ﬁnancial services provider with
“over 300 years of history and expertise in banking.”62 The KKR acquisition
was not Del Monte’s ﬁrst interaction with Barclays. In fact, Barclays
functioned as one of Del Monte’s “principal investment banks,”63 participating in various transactions in 2009 and 2010 that generated roughly $3.6
million in fees.64 Barclays was on even friendlier terms with KKR—over the
same period, Barclays earned over $66 million in fees from at least six KKR
consumer and retail projects. 65 At the time, Peter “P.J.” Moses was the
Barclays managing director with coverage responsibility for Del Monte.66

55 Press Release, Del Monte Foods Co., KKR, Vestar and Centerview Complete Acquisition
of Del Monte Foods (Mar. 8, 2011), http://investors.delmonte.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=662562.
56 B RYAN B URROUGH & J OHN H ELYAR , B ARBARIANS AT THE G ATE : T HE F ALL OF
RJR N ABISCO (1990).
57 B ARBARIANS AT THE G ATE (HBO 1993).
58 Press Release, Del Monte Foods Co., supra note 55; Company Overview of Centerview Capital Holdings, LLC, B LOOMBERG B USINESSWEEK, http://investing.businessweek.com/research/
stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=46401796 (last visited Nov. 23, 2013).
59 Portfolio, C ENTERVIEW C APITAL , http://cv.kbddev.com/consumer/portfolio/ (last visited
Nov. 23, 2013).
60 Press Release, Del Monte Foods Co., supra note 55.
61 History, VESTAR CAPITAL PARTNERS, http://www.vestarcapital.com/about-vestar/history
(last visited Nov. 23, 2013).
62 About Us, B ARCLAYS , http://group.barclays.com/About-us (last visited Nov. 23, 2013).
63 In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 819 (Del. Ch. 2011).
64 Del Monte Foods Co., Supplement �� to Deﬁnitive Proxy Statement (Form DEFA ��A),
at 5 (Feb. 4, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/866873/000119312511024568/
ddefa14a.htm.
65 Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 820.
66 Id. at 819.
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B. The Deal
Before Del Monte ever considered selling, Barclays’ Peter Moses
approached several potential bidders to gauge their interest in acquiring the
company.67 At a January 2010 meeting with KKR, Moses described his plan
to coordinate the sale of Del Monte: he believed the company would
privately solicit targeted bids and implied that KKR would be included in
the private solicitation. 68 KKR informed Moses that it was prepared to
“take the next step,” but before KKR could approach Del Monte about a
potential acquisition, Apollo Management, with whom Barclays had also
met, sent Del Monte a letter of interest.69
Based on the companies’ longstanding relationship, Del Monte contacted
Barclays for advice on how to proceed with Apollo. Barclays did not inform
Del Monte that it had discussed a potential acquisition with Apollo, nor did
the Del Monte board inquire whether Barclays had met with Apollo or any
other ﬁrms.70 Barclays also failed to mention that it had circulated internal
memos describing its intention to provide ﬁnancing should a deal come to
fruition.71 Instead, Peter Moses suggested that Del Monte privately solicit
bids via a targeted process that included Apollo, KKR working with Centerview, the Carlyle Group, CVC Partners, and the Blackstone Group.72
When information leaked that Del Monte was accepting bids, Vestar and
Campbell’s Soup were also included. 73 The chosen bidders consisted
exclusively of private equity ﬁrms rather than strategic parties who would

67
68
69

Id. at 820.
See id.
Id. Apollo was identiﬁed only as “Bidder A” in the Preliminary Proxy Statement sent to
Del Monte shareholders. See Consolidated Veriﬁed Class Action Complaint, supra note 50, para. 56.
70 Amended Consolidated Veriﬁed Class Action Complaint for Breach of Fiduciary Duties
& Aiding & Abetting, para. 38, Del Monte, 25 A.3d 813 (No. 6027-VCL), 2011 WL 675719. Barclays
did, however, note that it “knew many of the entities that might be an interested buyer.” Brief in
Support of Plaintiﬀ ’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 5, Del Monte, 25 A.3d 813 (No. 6027VCL), 2011 WL 487121.
71 See Brief in Support of Plaintiﬀ ’s Motion, supra note 70, at 5 (quoting Barclays’ internal
January 2010 “Project Hunt (Del Monte) Screen Committee Memo,” which stated that “Barclays
will look to participate in the acquisition ﬁnancing once [Del Monte] has reached a deﬁnitive
agreement with a buyer”).
72 Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 820-��. Plaintiﬀs and the court failed to address the fact that, at this
point, the Del Monte board of directors formed a Strategic Committee to identify the parties
from whom to solicit bids and to evaluate those bids. See Del Monte Defendants’ Opposition to
Plaintiﬀ ’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 7, Del Monte, 25 A.3d 813 (No. 6027-VCL), 2011
WL 487122 (“The Strategic Committee . . . expressly limited [Del Monte’s] outreach at this initial
stage to private equity ﬁrms . . . .”).
73 Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 821.
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not need Barclays’ ﬁnancing.74 All potential bidders signed conﬁdentiality
agreements preventing them from communicating with one another in
formulating their bids.75 By March 11, 2010, Apollo, KKR, Carlyle, CVC,
and Vestar submitted their bids.76 On March 18, 2010, however, the Del
Monte board abruptly ended the process, deciding that it was in the stockholders’ best interests at that time to remain independent.77
In April and May 2010, KKR approached Del Monte about a deal, but
the company was not receptive. 78 In September, Peter Moses met with
KKR and Vestar separately to suggest that, in violation of their conﬁdentiality agreements, the ﬁrms pair up to make a new oﬀer.79 The parties also
agreed that KKR would approach Del Monte to begin negotiations but
would conceal the fact that it intended to partner with Vestar until the last
minute.80 Pursuant to that strategy, KKR, still partnered with Centerview,
delivered a written indication of interest to Del Monte.81 The Del Monte
board considered the oﬀer and, departing from its earlier decision to remain
independent, ultimately decided to pursue a single-bidder strategy in favor
of KKR and Centerview.82 Over the next several weeks, Del Monte negotiated
the terms of the transaction with KKR.83 It was not until nearly a month
after submitting its letter of interest that KKR asked to include Vestar in
the deal—the Del Monte board summarily granted the request.84 The same
74 See Amended Consolidated Veriﬁed Class Action Complaint, supra note 70, para. 41. Barclays, however, claimed that it presented Del Monte as an acquisition opportunity to “a broad
range of strategic buyers and private equity ﬁrms.” Barclays Capital Inc.’s Answer to the
Amended Consolidated Veriﬁed Class Action Complaint at 13, Del Monte, 25 A.3d 813 (No. 6027VCL), 2011 WL 1213007.
75 Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 821.
76 Id. at 822.
77 Id. Del Monte notes in its answer to the amended complaint that it decided, based on “the
Company’s strong results in the third ﬁscal quarter of 2010 and the perceived lower level of
execution risk inherent in the Company’s long-range plan,” not to pursue a sale at that time. The
Individual Del Monte Defendants’ Answer to the Amended Consolidated Veriﬁed Class Action
Complaint at 23, Del Monte, 25 A.3d 813 (No. 6027-VCL), 2011 WL 1235372; see also Brief in
Support of Plaintiﬀ ’s Motion, supra note 70, at 10 (indicating that Del Monte’s stock price rose
roughly 37% between the time it initially solicited bids and the time it considered those bids).
78 Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 822-��. While plaintiﬀs alleged in their initial complaint that Mr.
Wolford met with KKR to discuss the acquisition, Del Monte contended in its answer that the
parties met to discuss diﬀerent joint investment opportunities, in particular a joint acquisition of
Waggin’ Train LLC. Individual Del Monte Defendants’ Answer, supra note 77, at 23-24.
79 Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 823.
80 Id. at 823-24.
81 Id. at 823.
82 Id. at 824. The Del Monte board of directors did, however, reject KKR’s request for exclusivity. Del Monte Defendants’ Opposition, supra note 72, at 15.
83 Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 825.
84 Id.
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day, the London Evening Standard publicized KKR’s attempt to acquire Del
Monte Foods.85
Barclays then asked Del Monte’s permission to partially ﬁnance the
merger.86 The Del Monte board granted the request and hired a second
investment bank, Perella Weinberg Partners LP, to provide an independent
fairness opinion for an additional $3 million.87 Although the board recognized that Barclays’ conﬂict of interest arising out of its participation in the
ﬁnancing would require an additional fairness opinion, it nevertheless
permitted Barclays to conduct the 45-day go-shop period between late
November 2010 and mid-January 2011.88
A merger agreement was signed on November 24, 2010, in which Blue
Acquisition Group agreed to acquire Del Monte Foods via a $5.3 billion
leveraged buyout. 89 The merger amounted to $19 per share of common
stock, a 40% premium over the average closing price. 90 The agreement
contained a “ﬁduciary out” for Del Monte, and a termination fee.91 The ﬁrst
round of proxy materials was released on January 12, 2011, and a second
round was sent out on February 4, 2011.92 Before stockholders could vote on the
transaction, plaintiﬀs ﬁled a derivative suit seeking a preliminary injunction.93

85 See Rosamund Urwin, City Wild with Talk a Suitor Is Stalking the Man from Del Monte,
L ONDON E VENING S TANDARD (Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.standard.co.uk/business/city-wildwith-talk-a-suitor-is-stalking-the-man-from-del-monte-6534109.html. In their original complaint,
shareholders alleged that KKR approached Vestar in response to this article, which “destroyed the
de facto exclusivity that KKR/Centerview had managed to secure for itself.” Consolidated Veriﬁed
Class Action Complaint, supra note 50, para. 71.
86 Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 825-26.
87 Id. at ���. The plaintiﬀs’ amended complaint alleges that Del Monte’s board of directors,
in considering whether to accept Barclays’ request to provide ﬁnancing, did not consider (�)
whether allowing Barclays to provide ﬁnancing would speed up the process, (�) whether it would
be necessary for KKR to secure ﬁnancing, (�) whether it would increase KKR’s bid, or (4) whether
Del Monte could use the request as leverage to obtain additional consideration in the transaction.
Amended Consolidated Veriﬁed Class Action Complaint, supra note 70, para. 73.
88 Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 827-28.
89 Id. at 817.
90 Id. The entire transaction was valued at roughly $5.3 billion, $1.3 billion of which was debt
assumed. Press Release, Del Monte Foods Co., KKR, Vestar and Centerview Enter into
Agreement to Acquire Del Monte Foods (Nov. 25, 2010), http://investors.delmonte.com/
releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=662531.
91 See Answering Brief of the Sponsor Defendants in Opposition to Plaintiﬀ ’s Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction at 3-4, Del Monte, 25 A.3d 813 (No. 6027-VCL), 2011 WL 495646 (noting
that the termination fee was “only 1.13% of the $5.3 billion total deal value during the go-shop and
2.26% post go-shop”).
92 Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 828-29.
93 Id. at 829-30.
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C. The Banks’ Fees
Although Del Monte did not disclose its fee structure with Barclays, its
proxy statement revealed that the company paid $2.5 million for Barclays’
fairness opinion, that it would pay $23.5 million upon completion of the
merger, and that Barclays stood to earn between $21 and $24 million from
ﬁnancing the merger. 94 Thus, of the roughly $47.5 million that Barclays
stood to earn in the transaction, slightly more than half was for ﬁnancing
and slightly less than half was for its role as sell-side advisor. For providing
its fairness opinion, Perella Weinberg earned a ﬂat fee of $3 million.95
IV. T HE LITIGATION
In their complaint, the plaintiﬀs raised duty of loyalty, inadequate disclosure, and duty of care claims.96 This Part considers each of those claims in turn.
A. Duty of Loyalty
The plaintiﬀs’ primary claims prior to discovery were that the merger
undervalued Del Monte Foods97 and that Del Monte’s management was
improperly persuaded to agree to the merger terms because KKR oﬀered
them management equity and assurance that they would keep their positions within the company after the merger was consummated. 98 The
complaint further alleged that the Del Monte board should have notiﬁed
Vestar that KKR had agreed to match its bid. 99 The most compelling
element of this claim was that “KKR and Centerview then, with the approval
of the Del Monte Board, approached Vestar and invited their most likely
competitor to join the Sponsor group instead of engaging in a competitive
auction.”100 The complaint also alleged that the Del Monte board of directors
allowed KKR to “buy the support” of Barclays by seeking Barclays’ assistance
in ﬁnancing the merger, and further breached its ﬁduciary duty by permitting
Barclays to conduct the go-shop process despite this “obvious conﬂict.”101

94 Del Monte Foods Co., Supplement �� to Deﬁnitive Proxy Statement, supra note 64, at 5.
The $23.5 million success fee would be reduced by the amount of the fee paid for Barclays’ fairness
opinion. Id.
95 Id. at 6.
96 Amended Consolidated Veriﬁed Class Action Complaint, supra note 70, para. 130.
97 Consolidated Veriﬁed Class Action Complaint, supra note 50, para. 44.
98 Id. para. 7.
99 Id. paras. 63-64.
100 Id. para. 9.
101 Id. paras. 10-11.
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B. Inadequate Disclosures
The plaintiﬀs also argued that Del Monte failed to adequately disclose
information regarding the process that resulted in the proposed acquisition;
the details of KKR’s communications with Del Monte’s management and
with Vestar; the ﬁnancial advisors in the transaction; and the details of both
fairness opinions.102 Del Monte promptly issued a proxy supplement, which
mooted these claims.103
C. Duty of Care
In their amended complaint, the plaintiﬀs also sought relief on the theory
that the Del Monte board breached its duty of care by failing to adequately
oversee Barclays, thereby permitting Barclays to secretly pair Vestar with
KKR in violation of their conﬁdentiality agreements, and to seek ﬁnancing
opportunities from KKR.104 After discovery, two points became clear: (1) that
Barclays—not the London Evening Standard105—was the impetus behind the
anticompetitive KKR–Vestar pairing, and (2) that Barclays had structured
the deal to include buy-side ﬁnancing because it had planned from the
outset to contribute part of that ﬁnancing.106 Thus, the plaintiﬀs claimed
that Del Monte’s board should have recognized and prevented Barclays’
conﬂict of interest in the transaction.
V. THE D ECISION
The court held that the Del Monte board breached its ﬁduciary duty of care
by failing to recognize and prevent Barclays’ conﬂict of interest in servicing the
merger, and that KKR aided and abetted the board’s breach.107 Because the
plaintiﬀs sought a preliminary injunction, the opinion primarily assesses the
probability of success on the merits108—speciﬁcally, the duty of care claim.
Because Del Monte had placed itself up for sale, the court identiﬁed
Revlon as the applicable standard of review, noting that the board was
required to “try in good faith, in such a setting, to get the best available

102
103

Id. paras. 78-88.
In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 817 (Del. Ch. 2011); see also Del
Monte Foods Co., Supplement �� to Deﬁnitive Proxy Statement, supra note 64.
104 Amended Consolidated Veriﬁed Class Action Complaint, supra note 70, para. 1.
105 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
106 See Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 817.
107 Id. at 818.
108 See id. at 830-37.
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transaction for the shareholders,” and that the board’s actions must have
been “reasonable in relation to their legitimate objective.” 109 The opinion
acknowledges the importance of a board’s reliance on experts in evaluating
the merits of a transaction, but notes that because investment banks play
such a vital role in acting as experts, “this Court has required full disclosure
of investment banker compensation and potential conﬂicts.”110 While the
court pointed out that the board could potentially have negotiated a higher
price when KKR requested to team up with Vestar, its primary concern was
that the board accepted Barclays’ request to provide ﬁnancing when it
instead could have obtained a disinterested negotiator.111 Likewise, the court
found it was unreasonable for the board to allow Barclays to conduct the goshop when it was in Barclays’ interest for the go-shop to fail.112 In determining that the board had acted unreasonably, the court ultimately concluded
that “[a]lthough the blame for what took place appears at this preliminary
stage to lie with Barclays, the buck stops with the Board.”113 Even though a
board is entitled to rely on experts, “when [it] is deceived by those who will
gain from such misconduct, the protections girding the decision itself
vanish”; accordingly, the Del Monte directors “failed to act reasonably in
connection with the sale process.”114
109
110
111

Id. at 830 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 831-32.
See id. at 834-35 (“[I]t was unreasonable for the Board to permit Barclays to take on a
direct conﬂict when still negotiating price.”).
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 836 (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also David A. Katz, Del Monte
and the Responsibility of a Board in a Sales Process, H ARV. L. S CH. F. ON C ORP. G OVERNANCE &
F IN. R EG. (Apr. 14, 2011), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/04/14/del-monte-and-theresponsibility-of-a-board-in-a-sales-process (“The opinion of Vice Chancellor Laster in the Del
Monte case is a powerful reminder to directors that actions such as hiring advisors and forming
special committees—while appropriate and even essential in some circumstances—do not obviate
the need for members of the board to be fully engaged in and actively supervising the process of
negotiating a signiﬁcant company transaction.”); Theodore Mirvis, Buyout and Deal Protections
Enjoined Due to Conﬂicted Advisor, H ARV. L. S CH. F. ON C ORP. G OVERNANCE & F IN. R EG.
(Feb. 16, 2011), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/02/16/buyout-and-deal-protectionsenjoined-due-to-conﬂicted-advisor (“[T]he decision serves as an important reminder to all
participants in M&A transactions that the terms of conﬁdentiality agreements should be properly
respected, that bankers should receive and follow clear instructions from selling boards, and that
bankers should ensure that any conﬂicts of interest are disclosed in advance, with speciﬁcity, to
the selling board of directors.”); Theodore Mirvis, Del Monte Settlement Highlights Risk of Conﬂicts
in Buyout Financing, H ARV. L. S CH. F. ON C ORP. G OVERNANCE & F IN. R EG. (Oct. 21, 2011),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/10/21/del-monte-settlement-highlights-risk-of-conﬂictsin-buyout-ﬁnancing (noting that the Del Monte “board was faulted for failing to take suﬃciently
strong measures to restore a fair process or oversee its advisor”). The plaintiﬀs put it bluntly in
their brief: “[T]he Board of Directors of Del Monte, repeatedly misled by its faithless ﬁnancial
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As a result of the board’s breach of its ﬁduciary duties, the court found
that failing to issue a preliminary injunction would result in irreparable
harm to Del Monte’s stockholders. The court reasoned that in the absence
of an injunction, “the Del Monte stockholders [would] be deprived forever
of the opportunity to receive a pre-vote topping bid in a process free of
taint from Barclays’ improper activities,” and that the 102(b)(7) exculpation
provision in Del Monte’s certiﬁcate of incorporation would render future
monetary damages unlikely if the transaction went through.115 Ultimately,
the shareholder vote was enjoined for twenty days, and, in order to allow
additional time for Del Monte to receive more bids, the Vice Chancellor
prohibited the parties from enforcing the no-solicitation, match-right, and
termination fee provisions contained in the merger agreement.116 The Vice
Chancellor also awarded the plaintiﬀs $22.3 million in attorney’s fees.117
VI. A FTER THE D ECISION
Over the twenty days during which the merger was enjoined, Del Monte
hired Perella Weinberg to conduct another go-shop; the investment bank
contacted seventy potential bidders, including forty-two strategic buyers.118
No additional bids resulted from that go-shop.119 The merger did eventually
close in April 2011, after a shareholder vote in early March. 120 Richard
advisor throughout the process, was out getting popcorn while this whole movie was being
produced.” Brief in Support of Plaintiﬀ ’s Motion, supra note 70, at 1.
115 Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 838. A 102(b)(7) provision limits or eliminates a director’s personal
liability for monetary damages arising from a breach of ﬁduciary duty, but does not limit liability
(1) for a breach of the director’s duty of loyalty or (2) for acts or omissions not in good faith, or
which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law. D EL. C ODE A NN. tit. 8,
§ 102(b)(7) (2011).
116 Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 818-19.
117 Jef Feeley, Del Monte Foods Wins Final Approval of Settlement of KKR Buyout Suits,
B LOOMBERG (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-01/del-monte-winsapproval-of-settlement-of-kkr-buyout-suits-1-.html; see also Eric S. Waxman & Robert S.
Saunders, Southern Peru: Debunking the Myth, SEC. L ITIG. R EP., Feb. 2012, at 1 (suggesting that
the Del Monte decision exhibits Delaware courts’ willingness to award interim fees to plaintiﬀs’
counsel, since Vice Chancellor Laster awarded $2.75 million in fees before the case settled for
plaintiﬀs’ counsel’s role in securing additional disclosures in the merger proxy statement).
118 Del Monte Foods Co., Supplement �� to Deﬁnitive Proxy Statement (Form DEFA ��A),
at 1 (Mar. 3, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/866873/000119312511055113/
ddefa14a.htm.
119 Id.
120 Katz, supra note 114. Of the shares that voted, 99% voted in favor of the merger. Jef
Feeley & Phil Milford, Del Monte, Barclays Pay $89.4 Million to Settle Buyout Suits, B LOOMBERG
B USINESSWEEK (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-10-06/del-montebarclays-pay-89-4-million-to-settle-buyout-suits.html; see also Individual Del Monte Defendants’
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Wolford stepped down from his position as Del Monte CEO shortly
thereafter.121 The parties settled in November 2011 for $89.4 million.122 Of
that total, Del Monte paid $65.7 million, $20 million of which was owed to
Barclays for its work on the deal; Barclays contributed $23.7 million.123
A November 2011 court ﬁling stated that federal prosecutors were investigating potential antitrust violations surrounding the merger. 124 At the
same time, shareholders brought suit in California alleging antitrust violations, but unsuccessfully argued that the settlement should go unapproved
in Delaware because it would render their California claims moot.125 As a
result of the Del Monte decision, at least nine major investment banks have
reexamined their lending processes.126
VII. W HY BLAME BARCLAYS? A N A NALYSIS OF THE D ECISION
The court explained that the Del Monte board breached its duty of care
“[b]y failing to provide the serious oversight that would have checked
Barclays’ misconduct.” 127 That misconduct involved (1) soliciting interest
from bidders before Del Monte was up for sale,128 (2) planning to seek the
board’s permission to provide ﬁnancing to an acquirer in the event that the
company was sold, 129 (3) pairing KKR with Vestar in violation of their
conﬁdentiality agreements with Del Monte,130 and (4) conducting the go-shop
after Del Monte agreed to allow Barclays to provide ﬁnancing to KKR.131
At ﬁrst glance, one might read the Del Monte decision as imposing a duty
on a board of directors to identify and prevent all conﬂicts of interest faced
Answer, supra note 77, at 14 (“[A]s of March 8, 2011, approximately 99% of the 151,400,000 shares
voted were cast in favor of the transaction at $19 per share.”).
121 Press Release, Del Monte Foods Co., supra note 55.
122 Feeley, supra note 117. The settlement gave shareholders about $0.50 more per share than
the original purchase price. Id.
123 Feeley & Milford, supra note 120.
124 See Jef Feeley, Del Monte, KKR Deal Faces U.S. Antitrust Probe, Lawyer Says, B LOOMBERG B USINESSWEEK (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-11-30/delmonte-kkr-deal-faces-u-s-antitrust-probe-lawyer-says.html.
125 Feeley, supra note 117.
126 Feeley & Milford, supra note 120. In the months following Del Monte, “no ﬁrm . . .
oﬀered sell-side ﬁnancing for a U.S. public company buyout valued at more than �� billion”; prior
to Del Monte such ﬁnancing was oﬀered in 40% of the deals of that size. Id.; see also Chon &
Ovide, supra note 28 (noting that despite criticism for creating conﬂicts of interest, staple
ﬁnancing was “common during the buyout boom of ����”).
127 In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 818 (Del. Ch. 2011).
128 Id. at 820.
129 Id. at 833.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 828.
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by investment bankers hired in conjunction with the sale of a company.
This reading, however, is far too broad. First, although the court found that
the board failed to exercise oversight in identifying conﬂicts, it also
acknowledged that “[i]nvestment banks generate large fees from doing deals,”
and that “[c]overage oﬃcers for investment banks regularly visit past, present,
and potential clients to suggest mergers, acquisitions, and other strategic
alternatives.”132 Given these statements, it seems as though Barclays acted the
way any other investment bank in the industry might have acted.
Second, the court recognized that the fee structures common in sell-side
advising engagements provide incentives for investment banks to drum up
business by actively pairing targets and acquirers. 133 As mentioned in
Section I.B., “incentive” or “success” fees encourage investment banks not
only to seek out the highest price for a company up for sale, but to execute a
sale regardless of whether it is necessarily in the best interests of a company
at that time. 134 And yet, despite the conﬂicts they generate, then-Vice
Chancellor Strine recognized in Toys “R” Us that Delaware courts condone
incentive fees.135
A narrower and more consistent reading of the Del Monte decision, then,
is that the duty of care requires a board to identify and guard against
unusual conﬂicts, but not those conﬂicts that are widely accepted in Delaware practice. With this narrower understanding of Del Monte in mind, I
analyze what the Del Monte board and Barclays did wrong, and then
consider how to approach the somewhat arbitrary distinction between conﬂicts
that the industry accepts and the “unusual” conﬂicts present in Del Monte.
A. What the Board Didn’t Do Wrong: Preventing Extra
Conﬂicts or Requiring Additional Disclosure
The court acknowledged that “[t]his case is diﬃcult because the Board
predominantly made decisions that ordinarily would be regarded as falling
within the range of reasonableness for purposes of enhanced scrutiny.”136 If
132
133
134
135

Id. at 819.
See id.
See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1005 & n.44 (Del. Ch. 2005); see also
id. at 1005-06 (holding that, even though “First Boston’s engagement provided for higher
compensation if it found a high-value, whole-Company deal rather than simply a buyer for Global
Toys,” there was still “simply no basis to conclude that First Boston’s questionable desire to
provide buy-side ﬁnancing ever inﬂuenced it to advise the board to sell the whole Company rather
than pursue a sale of Global Toys”).
136 Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 817.
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the board’s actions ordinarily would have been reasonable, then what, under
the facts of Del Monte, made its actions unreasonable? One way to approach
this inquiry is to ask, if the conﬂicts investment banks face in typical merger
transactions are acceptable under Delaware law, which of Barclays’ conﬂicts
went above and beyond these generally accepted conﬂicts? Alternatively,
the Del Monte decision might indicate that the board should have exercised
greater diligence by asking Barclays questions to determine whether it had
any conﬂicts of interest that it failed to disclose. In response to Del Monte,
one practitioner has suggested that to avoid liability, a board should ask its
advisors at the very beginning of the engagement to identify any potential
conﬂicts that may arise during the course of the transaction.137 This advice
suggests that disclosure of conﬂicts, rather than the existence of a conﬂict in
itself, implicates duty of care issues.
I would suggest, however, that more disclosure would not have made a
diﬀerence in Del Monte. In fact, regardless of whether the more important
issue is disclosure or the existence of a conﬂict in the ﬁrst place, disclosure
of Barclays’ conﬂicts would have failed to alert the Del Monte board to the
potential for misbehavior.
1. Actual Conﬂicts
If the court’s primary concern was the existence of actual conﬂicts in
Barclays’ secretly seeking to provide ﬁnancing, this view is problematic for
two reasons. First, Barclays was interested in the outcome of the deal from
the beginning. As Del Monte’s sell-side advisor, Barclays stood to gain
roughly $20 million if the company was sold. 138 This meant that it was
already in Barclays’ interest to eﬀectuate a sale regardless of whether the
company would retain more value by remaining independent. In the back of
Peter Moses’s mind was the fact that Barclays stood to gain an additional
roughly $�� million by providing ﬁnancing in the transaction—but again,
only if the company was sold. 139 That Barclays thought there was $40
million on the line rather than $20 million hardly changed Barclays’ incentive to sell Del Monte Foods.
137

See Katz, supra note 114; see also C LEARY G OTTLIEB S TEEN & H AMILTON LLP, L ESD EL M ONTE F OODS FOR C OMPANIES R UNNING (OR C ONSIDERING) A S ALE
2 (2011), available at www.cgsh.com/ﬁles/News/��debb��-b4a1-4fa4-abde-53ddc5a28fcb/
Presentation/NewsAttachment/9fcaf89f-f120-468a-b625-559516615584/CGSH%20Alert%20-%20Del%20
Monte%20Foods.pdf (suggesting that when hiring an investment banker, companies should
consider including a provision in the engagement letter that the banker may not, without board
approval, oﬀer to provide ﬁnancing services to a prospective bidder).
138 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
139 See supra text accompanying note 94.

SONS OF
P ROCESS
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Second, the possibility of providing ﬁnancing meant that it was in Barclays’ interest to ﬁnd a buyer who might require ﬁnancing. I would argue,
however, that at the beginning of any sell-side engagement with a fullservice investment bank, either (�) the possibility of providing ﬁnancing in
the deal is always open to the bank and therefore can always aﬀect its
involvement in a deal, or in the alternative, (2) the possibility of providing
ﬁnancing is so remote that, even if desired by the bank, that prospect will
not aﬀect how the bank proceeds with the deal. Either way, the possibility
of providing ﬁnancing aﬀects all full-service banks equally—as long as
staple ﬁnancing is permitted under Delaware law.140 And the only way that
the Del Monte board could have fully eliminated any conﬂicts arising from
the possibility of providing ﬁnancing would have been by foreclosing that
possibility at the beginning of its engagement with Barclays, which is not
required under Delaware law.141 Further, it is not entirely clear that prohibiting staple ﬁnancing in an engagement letter would prevent all conﬂicts.
For example, even if full-service banks are not all seeking to provide
ﬁnancing, it might be the case that they are seeking to please the private
equity ﬁrms bidding for target companies.142 Private equity ﬁrms represent
60% of investment banks’ top clients, and even when banks are not interested
in providing ﬁnancing, they have signiﬁcant ﬁnancial interests in obtaining
future business from these ﬁrms.143
2. Disclosure of Conﬂicts
If, however, disclosure of conﬂicts is the more important issue, then the
Del Monte board could have asked in its engagement letter that Barclays
140 See Foulds, supra note 15, at ��� (noting that there is no per se rule against staple ﬁnancing in Delaware). Since staple ﬁnancing has not been invalidated as per se illegal, the somewhat
arbitrary and unveriﬁable factor becomes: when did it occur to the investment bank that it might
provide ﬁnancing? From the outset of the deal, like Barclays in Del Monte, see 25 A.3d at 817, or
just before the agreement was approved, like First Boston in Toys “R” Us? See 877 A.2d at 1005.
141 See Foulds, supra note 15, at 525.
142 This argument is particularly relevant to Del Monte, as Barclays had a prior relationship
with KKR. See 25 A.3d at 820 (“Like many large banks, Barclays has strong relationships with
various [leveraged buyout] shops. KKR is one of Barclays’ more important clients.”). Yet
companies often value investment banks’ longstanding relationships with private equity ﬁrms. See,
e.g., New Mountain Finance Corp., Prospectus Supplement, at S-7 (Mar. 20, 2013), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1491925/000104746913003145/a2213796z497.htm (“Furthermore, the Investment Adviser's investment professionals have deep and longstanding relationships
in both the private equity sponsor community and the lending/agency community which they
have and will continue to utilize to generate investment opportunities.”).
143 See, e.g., Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 820 (noting that Barclays had earned over $66 million in
fees from KKR prior to the Del Monte acquisition).
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disclose any possible conﬂict that might occur over the course of the
engagement. Indeed, the most eﬀective way to deal with investment banks’
conﬂicts may simply be to ensure that the client, the board of the target
company, is aware of each conﬂict that exists, so that legal counsel can
advise the board as to how to proceed.144 While Barclays did disclose to the
board of directors that it had a potential conﬂict in acting as both Del
Monte’s sell-side advisor and KKR’s ﬁnancer, that disclosure came only
after Barclays had planned all along to seek permission to provide the
ﬁnancing. If Barclays had been up front from the beginning, however, what
might its disclosures have looked like?
1. Receiving incentive fees contingent on the consummation of a transaction
creates an incentive for the investment bank to approve a transaction regardless of whether that transaction is truly advisable.
2. If, in the future, the investment bank wishes to provide ﬁnancing to an
acquirer, and the company permits the investment bank to provide such
ﬁnancing, the investment bank will be incentivized to sell the company to a
party who requires ﬁnancing.

These conﬂicts are common to all investment banks, and requiring such
disclosures would essentially create a boilerplate conﬂicts provision for all
engagement letters that would do little to alter target boards’ oversight of
the sale process.
B. What the Board Did Wrong: Conducting the Go-Shop
By arguing that Barclays’ conﬂicts in the Del Monte transaction should
not have raised red ﬂags at the beginning of its engagement, I do not mean
to suggest that the board was entirely without fault. It is important to
recognize that when the possibility of Barclays providing ﬁnancing became a
reality, Barclays did in fact face an extraordinary conﬂict. Even after the
board permitted Barclays to participate in the ﬁnancing, it allowed Barclays
to conduct the go-shop. At this point, Barclays’ interests were clearly divergent from those of a “nonconﬂicted” bank. A bank with a success fee but only
a possibility of providing ﬁnancing would be interested in producing a
144 See Sal Guerrera et al., Stapled Financing in the Aftermath of Delaware’s Del Monte Decision,
in SKADDEN 2012 INSIGHTS 2, 3 (2012), available at http://www.skadden.com/sites/default/
ﬁles/publications/Skadden_����_Insights_Capital_Markets_�.pdf (advising that, in light of Del
Monte, a board should “evaluate any prior or existing relationships that the ﬁnancial advisor has
with actual or potential bidders and determine whether any potential conﬂicts of interest are likely
to develop, in each case carefully reﬂecting such consideration in its board minutes”).
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topping bid in the go-shop to attain the highest possible value for the
company, and, therefore, the highest fees for the bank; Barclays, however,
had already secured permission to provide ﬁnancing to a speciﬁc acquirer
and was not interested in ﬁnding another buyer who might not require its
ﬁnancing. The board should have recognized this conﬂict and should not
have allowed Barclays to conduct the go-shop.
C. The Standard for Investment Bank Conﬂicts Going Forward
On one hand, Delaware law has addressed the question of success fees
and has held that they are not per se illegal; in fact, they create conﬂicts
that nearly all investment banks in the industry share. On the other hand,
however, the court in Del Monte suggested that a board has a duty to seek
out and address—either by eliminating or disclosing—its investment bank’s
conﬂicts before it can rely on its bank’s advice in selling the company. With
so many conﬂicts implicitly accepted in the industry, the outcome in Del
Monte seems on some level arbitrary. After all, why accept Barclays’ roughly
$20 million incentive to push a sale through, but reject an additional $20
million incentive to select a bidder who requires ﬁnancing? With a duty of
care standard that requires directors to identify and correct or disclose some
conﬂicts but not others, courts are left with two choices: accept the fact that
investment banks as we currently use them are fundamentally conﬂicted, or
require a dramatic restructuring of the fee arrangements used in nearly all
M&A deals.
One is tempted to argue that investment bank conﬂicts do not deserve
the attention they received after Del Monte. For one, reputational eﬀects
may reign in investment banks’ behavior even where conﬂicts exist. 145
Further, it may be that “[m]anagement is sophisticated, and they hire the
bank not for advice in deciding between bids but for their contacts and
knowledge of prospective bidders.”146 This view may soften one’s outlook
on Barclays’ behavior, but it also weakens the claim that investment banks
have ﬁnancial expertise upon which directors can rely. Even so, one might
argue that Barclays’ conﬂicts did not make a diﬀerence for the Del Monte
board. Several market leaks alerted potential bidders to the fact that the

145 C.f. Andrew F. Tuch, Conﬂicted Gatekeepers: The Volcker Rule and Goldman Sachs, 7 V A . L.
& B US . R EV . 365, 386 (2012) (suggesting that investment banks acting as underwriters in the
securities oﬀering context have strong incentives to build and maintain reputations for diligence
and honesty).
146 Foulds, supra note 15, at 529.
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company was up for sale;147 Barclays did contact more than ﬁfty potential
acquirers during the ﬁrst go-shop period;148 and even after the litigation,
Perella Weinberg’s go-shop did not lead to any topping bids.149 We already
accept conﬂicts arising out of success fees—why arbitrarily reject other
conﬂicts as too much?
Another almost assuredly unpopular suggestion, but one I am inclined
to accept, would be to eliminate success fees in the industry altogether. The
facts of Del Monte suggest that serious manipulation will result when the
industry looks the other way as experts upon whom boards heavily rely in
large-scale transactions suﬀer from conﬂicts of interest. While the court in
Del Monte attempted to characterize Barclays’ conﬂicts as more serious than
those that generally exist in the industry, I have suggested in this Note that
they are not so easily distinguishable. The best way to prevent future
manipulation is to eliminate success fees and staple ﬁnancing altogether.
C ONCLUSION
The court’s dissection of Barclays’ misbehavior in Del Monte brought
attention to the conﬂicted position of an investment bank that gives sellside advice while secretly planning to later provide buy-side ﬁnancing.
While the Del Monte court imposed upon a board a duty to either eliminate
or disclose conﬂicts, some conﬂicts—like staple ﬁnancing—are not per se
illegal under Delaware law, and others—like success fees—are widely used
in the industry. But these are the only conﬂicts that plagued Barclays in the
Del Monte transaction. In order to prevent manipulation that ultimately
may harm stockholders, investment bank conﬂicts should be minimized
through the elimination of both success fees and staple ﬁnancing.
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